Gettier ve bilgide şans unsuru
AuthorBaşdemir, Yücel Hasan
MetadataShow full item record
CitationBaşdemir, Y. H. (2009). Gettier ve bilgide şans unsuru. Felsefe Dünyası, 50, 121-140.
Knowledge is traditionally defined as justified true belief. Gettier argue that the three components don't constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of the proposition that S knows that p. Gettier present his idea giving two cases that are called Gettier counterexamples. The cases indicate that it is possible that a justified true belief is true by luck. Knowledge is a cognitive success of mind. But luck is an obstacle for the cognitive success. Knowledge excludes luck. But three components can't preclude luck for knowledge. In this article I try to explain nature of epistemic luck and to give its main features. After I describe Gettier counterexamples I will argue that these examples have some sui generis feature. In these examples new conditions are always added to examples in such a way that confusing the cognitive position when epistemic agency will acquire knowledge. For this reason epistemic agency is unable to transform his true belief to knowledge. I assert that this is because structure of Gettier counterexamples. They are similar to a scenario inholding counterparts. All states of affair in possible worlds might become a part of the scenario in such a way that leading into error the epistemic agency.