Gettier ve bilgide şans unsuru

Abstract

Knowledge is traditionally defined as justified true belief. Gettier argue that the three components don't constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of the proposition that S knows that p. Gettier present his idea giving two cases that are called Gettier counterexamples. The cases indicate that it is possible that a justified true belief is true by luck. Knowledge is a cognitive success of mind. But luck is an obstacle for the cognitive success. Knowledge excludes luck. But three components can't preclude luck for knowledge. In this article I try to explain nature of epistemic luck and to give its main features. After I describe Gettier counterexamples I will argue that these examples have some sui generis feature. In these examples new conditions are always added to examples in such a way that confusing the cognitive position when epistemic agency will acquire knowledge. For this reason epistemic agency is unable to transform his true belief to knowledge. I assert that this is because structure of Gettier counterexamples. They are similar to a scenario inholding counterparts. All states of affair in possible worlds might become a part of the scenario in such a way that leading into error the epistemic agency.