Tanis, Abdulkadir2021-11-012021-11-0120211406-09221736-7514https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.2021.3.05https://hdl.handle.net/11491/7296In Islamic thought, the question How does God know tensed facts? has been thoroughly discussed over a tension between the attributes of omniscience and immutability. Avicenna and al-Ghazali, who give wide coverage to this problem in their studies, propose different solutions to eliminate this tension. Avicenna acknowledges that a being who knows tensed facts is subject to change, therefore he claims that God knows everything in a universal way and excludes tensed facts from the extent of omniscience. On the other hand, al-Ghazali claims that God knows tensed facts, but He does not undergo any real change by knowing them. In this study, I will argue that neither of these answers are convincing in generating a solution to the expressed tension.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessomniscienceimmutabilityAvicennaal-Ghazalitensed factsOMNISCIENCE, IMMUTABILITY AND TENSED FACTS IN AVICENNA AND AL-GHAZALIArticle25333935310.3176/tr.2021.3.05Q4WOS:0006877122000052-s2.0-85114054374Q2